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Mechanizing a Process Algebra for Network Protocols
Timothy Bourke · Robert J. van Glabbeek ·
Peter Höfner
Abstract This paper presents the mechanization of a process algebra for Mo-
bile Ad hoc Networks and Wireless Mesh Networks, and the development of a
compositional framework for proving invariant properties. Mechanizing the core
process algebra in Isabelle/HOL is relatively standard, but its layered structure
necessitates special treatment. The control states of reactive processes, such as
nodes in a network, are modelled by terms of the process algebra. We propose a
technique based on these terms to streamline proofs of inductive invariance. This
is not sufficient, however, to state and prove invariants that relate states across
multiple processes (entire networks). To this end, we propose a novel composi-
tional technique for lifting global invariants stated at the level of individual nodes
to networks of nodes.
Keywords Interactive Theorem Proving · Isabelle/HOL · Process Algebra ·
Compositional Invariant Proofs · Wireless Mesh Networks · Mobile Ad hoc
Networks
1 Introduction and related work
The Algebra for Wireless Networks (AWN) is a process algebra developed in partic-
ular for modelling and analysing protocols for Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs)
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and Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) [10, 11], but that can be used for reason-
ing about routing and communication protocols in general. This paper reports
on both its mechanization in Isabelle/HOL [29] and the development of a com-
positional framework for showing invariant properties of models.1 The techniques
we describe are a response to problems encountered during the mechanization of
a model and proof of a crucial correctness property for the Ad hoc On-demand
Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol, a widely used protocol, standardized
by the IETF [31]. The AODV case study is described in detail elsewhere [5] and
we only refer to it briefly in this paper. The property we study is loop freedom,
meaning that no data packet is sent in cycles forever. Such a property can only be
expressed by relating states of different (neighbouring) network nodes. Encoding
such inter-node properties in an Interactive Theorem Prover (ITP) proved quite
challenging, since the proof is performed inductively for an arbitrary number of
nodes and the base case is a single node whose neighbours do not yet exist. We
develop a novel compositional technique to address this challenge.
Despite extensive research on related problems [34] and several mechanized
frameworks for reactive systems [9, 18, 27], we are not aware of other solutions
that allow the compositional statement and proof of properties relating the states
of different nodes in a message-passing model—at least not within the strictures
imposed by an ITP.
Related work. AWN is a process algebra, but for the purposes of proving prop-
erties we treat it essentially as a structured programming language and employ
a technique originally proposed by Floyd [13] and later developed by Manna and
Pnueli [23], whereby a set of semantic rules is defined to link the syntax of a pro-
gram to an induced transition system. Safety properties are then shown to hold
for all reachable states by induction from a set of initial states over the set of tran-
sitions. Rather than define the induced transition system in terms of labels and
(virtual) program counters [23, Chapter 1], we use term derivatives and Structural
Operational Semantics (SOS) rules [32].
This separation between language and model differs from the approach taken
in formalisms like UNITY [8] and I/O Automata [22], where initial states and sets
of transitions are specified directly, and also from that of TLA+ [21], where the
initial states and transition relation are written as a formula of first-order logic.
The advantage of the language-plus-semantics approach is that sequencing and
branching in models is expressed by syntactic operators with the implied changes
in the underlying control state being managed by the semantic rules. Arguably,
this permits models that are easier to understand by experts in the system being
modelled. The disadvantage is some extra complexity and layers of definitions. We
find, however, that these details are well managed by ITPs and—once defined—
intrude little on the verification task.
AWN provides a unique mix of communication primitives and a treatment of
data structures that are essential for studying MANET and WMN protocols with
dynamic topologies and sophisticated routing logic [11, §1]. It supports commu-
nication primitives for one-to-one (unicast), one-to-many (groupcast), and one-to-all
(broadcast) message passing. AWN comprises distinct layers for expressing the struc-
ture of nodes and networks. We exploit this structure critically in our proofs, and
1 The Isabelle/HOL source files can be found in the Archive of Formal Proofs (AFP) [4].
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we expect the techniques proposed in Sections 3 and 4 to also apply to similar
layered modelling languages [15,16,24,25,28,33].
Besides this, our work differs from other mechanizations for verifying reactive
systems, like UNITY [18], TLA+ [9], or I/O Automata [27] (from which we drew
the most inspiration), in its explicit treatment of control states, in the form of
process algebra terms, as distinct from data states. In this respect, our approach is
close to that of Isabelle/Circus [12], but it differs in (1) the treatment of operators
for composing nodes, which we model directly as functions on automata, (2) the
treatment of recursive invocations, which we do not permit, and (3) our inclusion
of a framework for compositional proofs.
Within the process algebraic tradition, other work in ITPs focuses on showing
properties of process algebras, such as the treatment of binders [1], that bisimula-
tion equivalence is a congruence [17, 19], or properties of fix-point induction [36],
while we focus on what has been termed ‘proof methodology’ [14], and develop a
compositional method for showing correctness properties of protocols specified in
a process algebra.
As an alternative to the frameworks cited above, and the work we present,
Paulson’s inductive approach [30] can be applied to show properties of protocols
specified with less generic infrastructure. In fact, it has also been applied to model
the AODV protocol [39]; a detailed comparison is given elsewhere [5, §9]. But
we think this approach to be better suited to systems specified in a ‘declarative’
style as opposed to the strongly operational models we consider. The question of
style has practical implications. It determines the ‘distance’ between the original
specification and the formal model—perhaps surprisingly protocol descriptions are
often quite operational (this is the case for AODV [31]). It also likely influences
proofs of refinement between abstract and implementation models.
Structure and contributions. Section 2 describes the mechanization of AWN. The
basic definitions are routine but the layered structure of the language and the
treatment of operators on networks as functions on automata are relatively novel
and essential to understanding later sections. Section 3 describes our mechaniza-
tion of the theory of inductive invariants, closely following [23]. We exploit the
structure of AWN to generate verification conditions corresponding to those of
pen-and-paper proofs [11, §7]. Section 4 presents a compositional technique for
stating and proving invariants that relate states across multiple nodes. Basically,
we substitute ‘open’ SOS rules over the global state for the standard rules over
local states (Section 4.1), show the property over a single sequential process (Sec-
tion 4.2), ‘lift’ it successively over layers that model message queueing and network
communication (Section 4.3), and, ultimately, ‘transfer’ it to the original model
(Section 4.4).
Note. This paper is an extended version of [6]. It presents all details with regards
to the mechanization—many of which were skipped in [6] due to lack of space. We
also present more details about the novel compositional technique for lifting global
invariants, including motivation and examples. As a case study, the framework we
present in this paper was successfully applied in the mechanization of a proof
of AODV’s loop freedom, the details of which are available in the AFP [7] and
presented elsewhere [5].
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{l}[[u]] p ’l ⇒ (’k ⇒ ’k) ⇒ (’k, ’p, ’l) seqp ⇒ (’k, ’p, ’l) seqp
{l}〈g〉 p ’l ⇒ (’k ⇒ ’k set) ⇒ (’k, ’p, ’l) seqp ⇒ (’k, ’p, ’l) seqp
{l}unicast(sid , smsg ) . p . q ’l ⇒ (’k ⇒ ip) ⇒ (’k ⇒ msg) ⇒ (’k, ’p, ’l) seqp ⇒
(’k, ’p, ’l) seqp ⇒ (’k, ’p, ’l) seqp
{l}broadcast(smsg ) . p ’l ⇒ (’k ⇒ msg) ⇒ (’k, ’p, ’l) seqp ⇒ (’k, ’p, ’l) seqp
{l}groupcast(sids , smsg ) . p ’l ⇒ (’k ⇒ ip set) ⇒ (’k ⇒ msg) ⇒ (’k, ’p, ’l) seqp ⇒
(’k, ’p, ’l) seqp
{l}send(smsg ) . p ’l ⇒ (’k ⇒ msg) ⇒ (’k, ’p, ’l) seqp ⇒ (’k, ’p, ’l) seqp
{l}receive(umsg ) . p ’l ⇒ (msg ⇒ ’k ⇒ ’k) ⇒ (’k, ’p, ’l) seqp ⇒ (’k, ’p, ’l) seqp
{l}deliver(sdata ) . p ’l ⇒ (’k ⇒ data) ⇒ (’k, ’p, ’l) seqp ⇒ (’k, ’p, ’l) seqp
p ⊕ q (’k, ’p, ’l) seqp ⇒ (’k, ’p, ’l) seqp ⇒ (’k, ’p, ’l) seqp
call(pn) ’p ⇒ (’k, ’p, ’l) seqp
Fig. 1 Term constructors for sequential processes: (’k, ’p, ’l) seqp.
(Leading λ-abstractions are omitted, for example, λl u p. {l}[[u]] p is written {l}[[u]] p.)
2 The process algebra AWN
The Algebra for Wireless Networks (AWN) comprises five layers [11, §4]: (1) se-
quential processes for encoding the protocol logic as a recursive specification;
(2) parallel composition of sequential processes for running multiple processes si-
multaneously on a single node; (3) node expressions for encapsulating processes
running on a node and tracking a node’s address and neighbours (other nodes
within transmission range); (4) partial network expressions for describing networks
as parallel compositions of nodes and (5) complete network expressions for closing
partial networks to further interactions with an environment. We treat each layer
as an automaton with states of a specific form and a given set of transition rules.
We describe the layers from the bottom up over the following sections.
2.1 Sequential processes
Sequential processes are used to encode protocol logic. Each is modelled by a
(recursive) specification Γ of type ’p⇒ (’k, ’p, ’l) seqp, which maps process names of
type ’p to terms of type (’k, ’p, ’l) seqp, also parameterized by ’k, data states, and ’l,
labels. States of sequential processes have the form (ξ, p) where ξ is a data state of
type ’k and p is a control term of type (’k, ’p, ’l) seqp.2
Process terms are built from the constructors that are shown with their types
in Figure 1. Here we make use of types data, msg, and ip of application layer data,
messages and IP addresses (or any other node identifiers). These are to be defined
separately for any application of AWN. Furthermore, for any type ’t, the type
of sets of objects of type ’t is denoted ’t set. The inductive set seqp-sos, shown
in Figure 2, contains SOS rules for each constructor. It is parameterized by a
specification Γ and relates triples of source states, actions, and destination states.
The ‘prefix’ constructors are each labelled with an {l}. Labels are used to
strengthen invariants when a property is only true in or between certain states;
they have no influence on control flow (unlike in [23]). The prefix constructors are
2 In fact, control terms are also parameterized by the type of messages, which are specific
to a given protocol, but we prefer to omit this detail from the presentation given here.
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ξ’ = u ξ
((ξ, {l}[[u]] p), τ , (ξ’, p))∈ seqp-sos Γ
ξ’∈ g ξ
((ξ, {l}〈g〉 p), τ , (ξ’, p))∈ seqp-sos Γ
((ξ, {l}unicast(sid , smsg ) . p . q), unicast (sid ξ) (smsg ξ), (ξ, p))∈ seqp-sos Γ
((ξ, {l}unicast(sid , smsg ) . p . q), ¬unicast (sid ξ), (ξ, q))∈ seqp-sos Γ
((ξ, {l}broadcast(smsg ) . p), broadcast (smsg ξ), (ξ, p))∈ seqp-sos Γ
((ξ, {l}groupcast(sids , smsg ) . p), groupcast (sids ξ) (smsg ξ), (ξ, p))∈ seqp-sos Γ
((ξ, {l}send(smsg ) . p), send (smsg ξ), (ξ, p))∈ seqp-sos Γ
((ξ, {l}receive(umsg ) . p), receive msg, (umsg msg ξ, p))∈ seqp-sos Γ
((ξ, {l}deliver(sdata ) . p), deliver (sdata ξ), (ξ, p))∈ seqp-sos Γ
((ξ, p), a, (ξ’, p’))∈ seqp-sos Γ
((ξ, p ⊕ q), a, (ξ’, p’))∈ seqp-sos Γ
((ξ, q), a, (ξ’, q’))∈ seqp-sos Γ
((ξ, p ⊕ q), a, (ξ’, q’))∈ seqp-sos Γ
((ξ, Γ pn), a, (ξ’, p’))∈ seqp-sos Γ
((ξ, call(pn)), a, (ξ’, p’))∈ seqp-sos Γ
Fig. 2 SOS rules for sequential processes: seqp-sos.
assignment, guard/bind, network synchronizations unicast/broadcast/groupcast/receive,
and internal communications send/receive/deliver.
The assignment {l}[[u]] p transforms the data state ξ deterministically into the
data state ξ’, according to the function u, and then acts as p. ‘During’ the update
a τ-action is performed. In the original AWN [10,11], the data state ξ was defined
as a partial function from data variables to values of the appropriate type, and the
assignment u modified or extended this partial function by (re)mapping a specific
variable to a new value, which could depend on the current data state. In our
mechanization the type of data states is given as an abstract parameter of the
language that is not yet instantiated in any particular way. Consequently, u is
taken to be any function of type ’k ⇒ ’k, modifying the data state. In comparison
with [10,11], our current treatment is less syntactic and more general.
The guard/bind statement {l}〈g〉 p encodes both guards and variable bindings.
Here g is of type ’k⇒ ’k set, a function from data states to sets of data states. Execut-
ing a guard amounts to making a nondeterministic choice of one of the data states
obtainable from the current state ξ by applying g; in case g(ξ) is empty no transi-
tion is possible. For a valuation function h of type ’k ⇒ bool the guard statement
is implemented as {l}〈λξ. if h ξ then {ξ} else ∅〉 p, which has no outgoing transition
if h evaluates to false. Variable binding like 〈λξ. {ξ(|no := n|) | n < 5}〉 p returns all
possible states that satisfy the binding constraint. In the original AWN [10, 11],
where the data state ξ was a partial function from data variables to values, the
execution of a guard/bind construct could only extend the domain of ξ, thereby
assigning values to previously unbound variables. In our more abstract approach
to data states, we must allow any manipulation of the (as of yet unspecified) data
state. As this includes changing values of already bound variables, the guard/bind
construct strictly subsumes assignment. Since this ‘misuse’ of a guard as assign-
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ment is not allowed in the original semantics of AWN [10, 11], we prefer to keep
both.
The sequential process {l}unicast(sid , smsg ) . p . q tries to unicast the message smsg
to the destination sid ; if successful it continues to act as p and otherwise as q. In
other words, unicast(sid , smsg ) . p is prioritized over q, which is only considered when
the unicast action is not possible (¬unicast (sid ξ)). Which of the actions unicast or
¬unicast will occur depends on whether the destination sid is in transmission range
of the current node; this is implemented by the first two rules of Figure 7 (described
later). In [10,11] the message smsg is an expression with variables that evaluates to a
message depending on the current values of those variables. Here, more abstractly,
it can be any function of type ’k⇒ msg that constructs a message from the current
data state. The sequential process {l}broadcast(smsg ) . p broadcasts smsg to the other
network nodes within transmission range.3 The process {l}groupcast(sids , smsg ) . p
tries to transmit smsg to all destinations sids , and proceeds as p regardless of whether
any of the transmissions is successful.
The sequential process {l}send(smsg ) . p synchronously transmits a message to
another process running on the same network node; this action can occur only when
the other sequential process is able to receive the message. The sequential process
{l}receive(umsg ) . p receives any message umsg either from another node, from another
sequential process running on the same node, or from the client4 connected to the
local node. It then proceeds as p, but with an updated data state (the state change
is triggered by the message). In the original syntax and semantics of AWN, umsg
was a data variable of type msg; here it is an abstract function of type msg⇒ ’k⇒ ’k,
which changes the data state. The submission of data from a client is modelled by
the receipt of a special message (Newpkt d dst), where the function Newpkt generates
a message containing the data d and the intended destination dst. Data is delivered
to the client by {l}deliver(sdata ) . p.
The other constructors are unlabelled and serve to ‘glue’ processes together:
The choice construct p ⊕ q takes the union of two transition sets and hence may
act either as p or as q. The procedure call call(pn) affixes a term from the specifica-
tion (Γ pn). The behaviour of call(pn) is exactly the same as that of the sequential
process that Γ associates to the process name pn. In [10, 11], on the other hand,
process names pn are explicitly parameterized with a list of data variables which
can be defined by arbitrary data expressions at the call site. The semantics of the
process call involves running the process Γ pn on an updated data state, obtained
by evaluating the data expressions in the current state and assigning the result-
ing values to the corresponding variables, while clearing the values of all variables
that do not occur as parameters of pn, effectively making them undefined. In the
current treatment, this behaviour is recovered by preceding a call(pn) by an explicit
assignment statement. As variables cannot be made undefined, they are cleared
by setting them to arbitrary values. This change is the biggest departure from
the original definition of AWN; it simplifies the treatment of call, as we show in
Section 3.1, and facilitates working with automata where variable locality makes
little sense. The drawback is that the atomic ‘assign and jump’ semantics is lost,
which is sometimes inconvenient (an example is given later in Section 2.2).
3 Whether a node is within transmission range or not is determined later on.
4 The application layer that initiates packet sending and awaits receipt of a packet.
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ΓToy PToy = labelled PToy ( receive(λmsg’ ξ. ξ (| msg := msg’ |)). {PToy-:0}
[[λξ. ξ (|nhid := id ξ|)]] {PToy-:1}
( 〈is-newpkt〉 {PToy-:2}
[[λξ. ξ (|no := max (no ξ) (num ξ)|)]] {PToy-:3}
broadcast(λξ. Pkt (no ξ) (id ξ)). {PToy-:4}
[[clear-locals]] call(PToy) {PToy-:5}
⊕ 〈is-pkt〉 {PToy-:2}
( 〈λξ. if num ξ > no ξ then {ξ} else ∅〉 {PToy-:6}
[[λξ. ξ (|no := num ξ|)]] {PToy-:7}
[[λξ. ξ (|nhid := sid ξ|)]] {PToy-:8}
broadcast(λξ. Pkt (no ξ) (id ξ)). {PToy-:9}
[[clear-locals]] call(PToy) {PToy-:10}
⊕ 〈λξ. if num ξ ≤ no ξ then {ξ} else ∅〉 {PToy-:6}
[[clear-locals]] call(PToy)))) {PToy-:11}
Fig. 3 AWN-specification of a toy protocol.
An example sequential process. We give the specification of a simple ‘toy’ proto-
col as a running example. The formal AWN specification is presented in Figure 3.
Nodes following the protocol broadcast messages containing an integer no. Each re-
members the largest integer it has received and drops messages containing smaller
or equal values.
The protocol is defined by a process named PToy that maintains three variables:
the integer no; an identifier id—also an integer, which uniquely identifies a node (for
example, the node’s IP address); and an identifier nhid that stores a node address
(either that of the node itself, or the address of another node that supplied the
largest number in the last comparison it made).5 The initial values of nhid and no
are id and 0, respectively.
The behaviour of a single node in our toy protocol is given by the recursive
specification ΓToy and an initial state (ξ, p) consisting of a data state ξ—defined
above—and a control term p—here the process ΓToy PToy. The specification ΓToy,
given in Figure 3, assigns a process term to each process name—here only to the
name PToy. The process term ΓToy PToy is defined as the result of applying a func-
tion labelled to two arguments: an identifier and the actual process without labels.
The labels are supplied by the function labelled: it associates its first argument
paired with a number as a label to every prefix construct occurring as a subterm.
We show these labels on the right-hand side of Figure 3. Note that the choice con-
struct ⊕ and the subterms call(PToy) do not receive a label. Moreover, the function
labelled is defined in such a way that both arguments of the ⊕ receive the same
label; this way labels correspond exactly to states that can be reached during the
execution of the process.
A node id running the protocol PToy will wait until it receives a message msg’
(line {PToy-:0}). The protocol then updates the local data state ξ by assigning the
message msg’ to the variable msg (λξ. ξ (| msg := msg’ |)). In our scenario, there are
two message constructors Pkt d src and Newpkt d dst; both carry an identifier (src and
dst) and an integer-payload d. Here, src is, by design, the sender of the message. We
require that all messages from the client of a node must have the form Newpkt d dst.
5 The protocol behaviour regarding nhid is rather arbitrary; it only serves to illustrate some
forthcoming concepts.
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PToy
{PToy-:0}
{PToy-:1}
{PToy-:2}
{PToy-:3}
{PToy-:4}
{PToy-:5}
broadcast
[[· · · ]]
〈· · · 〉
{PToy-:6}
{PToy-:7}
{PToy-:8}
{PToy-:9}
{PToy-:10}
broadcast
[[· · · ]]
[[· · · ]]
〈· · · 〉
{PToy-:11}
〈· · · 〉
〈· · · 〉
[[· · · ]]
receive
[[· · · ]]
[[· · · ]]
[[· · · ]]
Fig. 4 Control state structure of ΓToy.
All messages sent by a node have the form Pkt d src. The message type thus uniquely
determines whether the message originated from the application layer or from
another node.
The choice ({PToy-:2}) makes a case distinction based on whether the message
received is a new packet or a ‘standard’ one. In the former case, the guard/bind
statement is-newpkt ‘evaluates to true’6 and copies the message content d to the
variable num. Formally, is-newpkt is defined as
is-newpkt ξ = case msg ξ of
Pkt d src ⇒ ∅
| Newpkt d dst ⇒ {ξ(|num := d|)} .
Afterwards, the process proceeds to execute the lines labelled {PToy-:3}, {PToy-:4},
and {PToy-:5}. In the case of a ‘standard’ message, the statement is-pkt evaluates to
true, the local state is updated by copying the message contents d into num and src
into sid, and the protocol proceeds with lines {PToy-:6}–{PToy-:11}.
In line {PToy-:3} the protocol compares the stored integer no with the integer num
that came from the incoming message, determines and stores the larger one into
the variable no, and broadcasts this value to all its neighbours with itself listed as
sender (line {PToy-:4}). After that, in line {PToy-:5}, the process calls itself recursively,
after resetting the local variables msg, num, and sid to arbitrary values.
Depending on the contents of the ‘standard’ message, the protocol performs two
different sequences of actions. (1) If the integer taken from the message and stored
in variable num is larger than the stored no (line {PToy-:6}), then it is stored in vari-
able no (line {PToy-:7}) and the sender of the message is stored in nhid (line {PToy-:8}).
Before resetting the local variables and returning to the start of the protocol by a
6 By this we mean that when it is applied to the current data state it returns a non-empty
set of updated data states.
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Γqmsg Qmsg = labelled Qmsg (
receive(λmsg msgs. msgs @ [msg]) . call(Qmsg) {Qmsg-:0}
⊕ 〈λmsgs. if msgs 6= [ ] then {msgs} else ∅〉 {Qmsg-:0}
( send(λmsgs. hd msgs) . {Qmsg-:1}
( [[λmsgs. tl msgs]] call(Qmsg) {Qmsg-:2}
⊕ receive(λmsg msgs. tl msgs @ [msg]) . call(Qmsg)) {Qmsg-:2}
⊕ receive(λmsg msgs. msgs @ [msg]) . call(Qmsg))) {Qmsg-:1}
Fig. 5 AWN-specification of the queue process.
recursive call (line {PToy-:10}), the node sends out the just updated number no, again
identifying itself as sender (line {PToy-:9}). (2) If the integer from the message is
smaller than or equal to no (line {PToy-:6}), the node considers the message content
outdated, drops the message, and calls itself recursively.
As mentioned before, every sequential process is modelled by an automaton—a
record7 of two fields: a set of initial states and a set of transitions—parameterized
by an address i:
ptoy i = (|init = {(toy-init i, ΓToy PToy)}, trans = seqp-sos ΓToy|) ,
where toy-init i yields the initial data state (|id = i, no = 0, nhid = i, msg = SOME x. True,
num = SOME x. True, sid = SOME x. True|). The last three variables are initialized to
arbitrary values, as they are considered local. A representation of the automaton
toy-init i that abstracts from the data state is depicted in Figure 4.
2.2 Local parallel composition
Message sending protocols must nearly always be input enabled, that is, nodes
should always be in a state where they can receive messages.8 To achieve this,
and to model asynchronous message transmission, the protocol process is com-
bined with a queue model. A queue can be expressed in AWN as the specification
Γ qmsg with a single process Qmsg shown in Figure 5. Unlike the data state of
the PToy process, which mapped variable names to values, the data state msgs
of Qmsg is simply a list of messages. The control term is always ready to receive a
message (lines {Qmsg-:0}, {Qmsg-:1}, and {Qmsg-:2}), in which case it appends (@ con-
catenates lists) the received message onto the state. When the state is not empty
(line {Qmsg-:0}), the first element can be sent (line {Qmsg-:1}: hd returns the head of
a list), and, on doing so, removes it from the state (line {Qmsg-:2}: tl returns the
tail of a list). A receive command must be repeated at each control location to
ensure input enabledness. Compared to the Qmsg process in the original presenta-
tion of AWN [11, Process 6], there is an extra receive at {Qmsg-:2}. It is necessary
due to the modelling of parameter passing by an assignment followed by a re-
cursive call, which introduces a τ -transition. This is unfortunate, but eliminating
7 The generic record has type (’s, ’a) automaton, where the type ’s is the domain of states,
here pairs of data records and control terms, and ’a is the domain of actions.
8 The semantics of AWN ensures that any message transmitted by a node will be received
by all intended destinations that are within transmission range—the reasons for this design
decision are given in [10, 11]. In this setting, the absence of input enabledness would give rise
to the unrealistic phenomenon of blocking, the situation where one node is unable to transmit
a message simply because another one is not ready to receive it.
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(s, a, s’)∈TA
∧
m. a 6= receive m
((s, t), a, (s’, t))∈ parp-sos TA TB
(t, a, t’)∈TB
∧
m. a 6= send m
((s, t), a, (s, t’))∈ parp-sos TA TB
(s, receive m, s’)∈TA (t, send m, t’)∈TB
((s, t), τ , (s’, t’))∈ parp-sos TA TB
Fig. 6 SOS rules for parallel processes: parp-sos.
parameter passing greatly simplifies the constructions presented in Section 3. The
corresponding automaton is instantiated with an initially empty list:
qmsg = (|init = {([ ], Γqmsg Qmsg)}, trans = seqp-sos Γqmsg|) ,
The composition of the example protocol with the queue is expressed as
ptoy i 〈〈 qmsg .
This local parallel operator is a function over automata:
A 〈〈 B = (|init = init A × init B, trans = parp-sos (trans A) (trans B)|) .
This is an operator of type (’s, ’a) automaton⇒ (’t, ’a) automaton⇒ (’s × ’t, ’a) automaton.
The process (automaton) A 〈〈 B is a parallel composition of A and B, running on the
same network node. As formalized in Figure 6, an action receive m of A synchronizes
with an action send m of B into an internal action τ . The receive actions of A and
send actions of B cannot occur separately. All other actions of A and B, including
send actions of A and receive actions of B, occur interleaved in A 〈〈 B. A parallel
process expression denotes a parallel composition of sequential processes—each
with states (ξ, p)—with information flowing from right to left. The variables of
different sequential processes running on the same node are maintained separately,
and thus cannot be shared.
2.3 Nodes
At the node level, a local (parallel) process A is wrapped in a layer that records
its address i and tracks the set of neighbouring node addresses, initially R0. We
define a function from these two parameters and A, an arbitrary automaton, as
〈i : A : R0〉 = (|init = {s iR0 | s∈ init A}, trans = node-sos (trans A)|) .
Node states are triples denoted s iR. Figure 7 presents the rules of node-sos. Output
network synchronizations, like groupcast or broadcast, are filtered by the list of neigh-
bours to become ∗cast actions. So, an action R:∗cast(m) transmits a message m that
can be received by the set R of network nodes. A failed unicast attempt by the
process A is modelled as an internal action τ of the node expression.
There is no rule for propagating send m actions from sequential processes to the
node level. These actions may only occur locally when paired with a receive action;
they then become τ -transitions, which are propagated. The H¬K:arrive(m) action—
instantiated in Figure 7 as ∅¬{i}:arrive(m) and {i}¬∅:arrive(m)—is used to model a
message m received simultaneously by nodes in H and not by those in K. The rules
for arrive m in Figure 7 state that the arrival of a message at a node happens if
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(s, unicast dst m, s’)∈TA dst∈R
(s iR, {dst}:∗cast(m), s’ iR)∈ node-sos TA
(s, ¬unicast dst, s’)∈TA dst /∈ R
(s iR, τ , s’
i
R)∈ node-sos TA
(s, broadcast m, s’)∈TA
(s iR, R:∗cast(m), s’ iR)∈ node-sos TA
(s, groupcast D m, s’)∈TA
(s iR, (R ∩ D):∗cast(m), s’ iR)∈ node-sos TA
(s, receive m, s’)∈TA
(s iR, {i}¬∅:arrive(m), s’ iR)∈ node-sos TA
(s, deliver d, s’)∈TA
(s iR, i:deliver(d), s’
i
R)∈ node-sos TA
(s iR, ∅¬{i}:arrive(m), s iR)∈ node-sos TA
(s, τ , s’)∈TA
(s iR, τ , s’
i
R)∈ node-sos TA
(s iR, connect(i, i’), s iR ∪ {i’})∈ node-sos TA (s iR, connect(i’, i), s iR ∪ {i’})∈ node-sos TA
(s iR, disconnect(i, i’), s iR - {i’})∈ node-sos TA (s iR, disconnect(i’, i), s iR - {i’})∈ node-sos TA
i 6= i’ i 6= i’’
(s iR, connect(i’, i’’), s
i
R)∈ node-sos TA
i 6= i’ i 6= i’’
(s iR, disconnect(i’, i’’), s
i
R)∈ node-sos TA
Fig. 7 SOS rules for nodes: node-sos.
and only if the node receives it, whereas non-arrival can happen at any time. This
embodies the assumption that, at any time, any message that is transmitted to a
node within range of the sender is actually received by that node [10,11].
Internal actions τ and the action {i}:deliver(d) are simply inherited by node
expressions from the processes that run on these nodes. Finally, we allow actions
connect(i, i’) and disconnect(i, i’) for nodes i and i’. They model changes in network
topology. Each node must synchronize with such an action. These actions can
be thought of as occurring nondeterministically or as actions instigated by the
environment of the modelled network protocol. In this formalization node i’ is in
the range of node i, meaning that i’ can receive messages sent by i, if and only if i
is in the range of i’.
2.4 Partial networks
Partial networks are specified by values of type net-tree. A net-tree is either a
node 〈i; R0〉 with address i and a set of initial neighbours R0, or a composi-
tion of two net-trees Ψ1‖Ψ2. Hence it denotes a network topology. The net-tree
((〈1; {2}〉 ‖ 〈2; {1, 3}〉) ‖ 〈3; {2}〉), for instance, puts the three nodes 1, 2, and 3 in
a linear topology where 2 is connected to 1 and 3. The name net-tree refers to
the parse tree of its syntactic expression; unlike in [10, 11], it is treated as a tree
because we do not make use of the associativity of the parallel composition.
The function pnet maps such a value, together with the process np i to execute
at each node i, here parameterized by an address, to an automaton:
pnet np 〈i; R0〉 = 〈i : np i : R0〉
pnet np (Ψ1 ‖Ψ2) = (|init = {s1 q s2 | s1 ∈ init (pnet np Ψ1) ∧ s2 ∈ init (pnet np Ψ2)},
trans = pnet-sos (trans (pnet np Ψ1)) (trans (pnet np Ψ2))|) ,
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(s, R:∗cast(m), s’)∈TA (t, H¬K:arrive(m), t’)∈TB H ⊆ R K ∩ R = ∅
(s q t, R:∗cast(m), s’q t’)∈ pnet-sos TA TB
(s, H¬K:arrive(m), s’)∈TA (t, R:∗cast(m), t’)∈TB H ⊆ R K ∩ R = ∅
(s q t, R:∗cast(m), s’q t’)∈ pnet-sos TA TB
(s, H¬K:arrive(m), s’)∈TA (t, H’¬K’:arrive(m), t’)∈TB
(s q t, (H ∪ H’)¬(K ∪ K’):arrive(m), s’q t’)∈ pnet-sos TA TB
(s, i:deliver(d), s’)∈TA
(s q t, i:deliver(d), s’q t)∈ pnet-sos TA TB
(t, i:deliver(d), t’)∈TB
(s q t, i:deliver(d), s q t’)∈ pnet-sos TA TB
(s, τ , s’)∈TA
(s q t, τ , s’q t)∈ pnet-sos TA TB
(t, τ , t’)∈TB
(s q t, τ , s q t’)∈ pnet-sos TA TB
(s, connect(i, i’), s’)∈TA (t, connect(i, i’), t’)∈TB
(s q t, connect(i, i’), s’q t’)∈ pnet-sos TA TB
(s, disconnect(i, i’), s’)∈TA (t, disconnect(i, i’), t’)∈TB
(s q t, disconnect(i, i’), s’q t’)∈ pnet-sos TA TB
Fig. 8 SOS rules for partial networks pnet-sos.
The states of such automata mirror the tree structure of the network term; we
denote composed states by s1q s2. This structure and the node addresses remain
constant during an execution.
The preceding definitions for sequential processes, local parallel composition,
nodes, and partial networks suffice to model an example three-node network of toy
processes:
(pnet (λi. ((ptoy i) 〈〈 qmsg)) ((〈1; {2}〉 ‖ 〈2; {1, 3}〉) ‖ 〈3; {2}〉)) .
The function pnet is not present in [10, 11], where a partial network is defined
simply as a parallel composition of nodes, where in principle a different process
could be running on each node. With pnet we ensure that in fact the same process
is running on each node, and that this process is specified separately from the
network topology.
Figure 8 presents the rules of pnet-sos. An R:∗cast(m) action of one node syn-
chronizes with an action arrive m of all other nodes, where this arrive m amalgamates
the arrival of message m at the nodes in the transmission range R of the ∗cast m,
and the non-arrival at the other nodes. The third rule of Figure 8, in combina-
tion with the rules for arrive in Figure 7 and the fact that qmsg is always ready to
receive m, ensures that a partial network can always perform an H¬K:arrive(m) for
any combination of H and K consistent with its node addresses. Yet pairing with
an R:∗cast(m), through the first two rules in Figure 8, is possible only for those H
and K that are consistent with the destinations in R.
Internal actions τ and the action i:deliver(d) are interleaved in the parallel com-
position of nodes that makes up a network.
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(s, connect(i, i’), s’)∈TA
(s, connect(i, i’), s’)∈ cnet-sos TA
(s, disconnect(i, i’), s’)∈TA
(s, disconnect(i, i’), s’)∈ cnet-sos TA
(s, R:∗cast(m), s’)∈TA
(s, τ , s’)∈ cnet-sos TA
(s, τ , s’)∈TA
(s, τ , s’)∈ cnet-sos TA
(s, i:deliver(d), s’)∈TA
(s, i:deliver(d), s’)∈ cnet-sos TA
(s, {i}¬K:arrive(Newpkt d dst), s’)∈TA
(s, i:newpkt(d, dst), s’)∈ cnet-sos TA
Fig. 9 SOS rules for complete networks.
2.5 Complete networks
The last layer closes a network to further interactions with an environment. It
ensures that a message cannot be received unless it is sent within the network or
it is a Newpkt.
closed A = A(|trans := cnet-sos (trans A)|) .
The rules for cnet-sos are straightforward and presented in Figure 9.
The closed-operator passes through internal actions, as well as the delivery of
data to destination nodes, this being an interaction with the outside world. The
∗cast actions are declared internal at this level; they cannot be influenced by the
outside world. The connect and disconnect actions are passed through in Figure 9,
thereby placing them under the control of the environment. Actions arrive m are
simply blocked by the encapsulation—they cannot occur without synchronizing
with a ∗cast m—except for {i}¬K:arrive(Newpkt d dst). This action represents new
data d that is submitted by a client of the modelled protocol to node i for delivery
at destination dst.
3 Basic invariance
This paper only considers proofs of invariance, that is, properties of reachable
states and reachable transitions. The basic definitions are classic [27, Part III].
Definition 3.1 (reachability) Given an automaton A and an assumption I over
actions, reachable A I is the smallest set defined by the rules:
s∈ init A
s∈ reachable A I
s∈ reachable A I (s, a, s’)∈ trans A I a
s’∈ reachable A I .
As usual, all initial states are reachable, and so is any state that can be reached
from a reachable state by a single a-transition that satisfies property I.
Definition 3.2 (invariance) Given an automaton A and an assumption I, a pred-
icate P is (state) invariant, denoted A ||= (I →) P, iff ∀ s∈ reachable A I. P s.
We define reachability relative to an assumption on (input) actions I. When I is
λ-. True, we write simply A ||= P.
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Using this definition of invariance, we can state a basic property of an instance
of the toy process:
ptoy i ||= onl ΓToy (λ(ξ, l). l∈ {PToy-:2..PToy-:8} −→ nhid ξ = id ξ) . (1)
This invariant states that between the lines labelled PToy-:2 and PToy-:8, that is,
after the assignment of PToy-:1 until before the assignment of PToy-:8, the values of
nhid and id are equal. Here onl Γ P, defined as λ(ξ, p). ∀ l∈ labels Γ p. P (ξ, l), extracts
labels from control states, thereby converting a predicate on data states and line
numbers into one on data states and control terms.9 Because a ⊕-control term
is unlabelled, the function label takes the labels of both of its arguments; for this
reason labels Γ p generally yields a set of labels rather than a single label. As a
control state call(pn) also is unlabelled, the function label associates labels with it
by unwinding the recursion; to enable this, label takes the recursive specification Γ
as an extra argument.
The statements of properties that are true of all reachable states (for example,
(5), given later) do not depend on the values of control states nor the associated
labels, but their proofs will if they involve other invariants (like that of (1)).
Technically, the labels then form an integral part of the process model. While this
is unfortunate, expressing invariants in terms of the underlying control states is
simply impractical: the terms are unwieldy and susceptible to modification.
State invariants concentrate on single states only. It is, however, often useful
to characterize properties describing possible changes of the state.
Definition 3.3 (transition invariance) Given an automaton A and an assump-
tion I, a predicate P is transition invariant, denoted A ||≡ (I →) P, iff
∀ a. I a −→ (∀ s∈ reachable A I. ∀ s’. (s, a, s’)∈ trans A −→ P (s, a, s’)) .
An example for a transition invariant of our running example is that the value
of no never decreases over time:
ptoy i ||≡ (λ((ξ, -), -, (ξ’, -)). no ξ ≤ no ξ’) . (2)
Here, the assumption on (input) actions I is λ-. True and hence skipped. In case
we want to restrict the statement to specific line numbers, the mechanization
provides a function that extracts labels from control states, similar to onl for state
invariance:
onll Γ P = λ((ξ, p), a, (ξ’, p’)). ∀ l∈ labels Γ p. ∀ l’∈ labels Γ p’. P ((ξ, l), a, (ξ’, l’)) .
Our invariance proofs follow the compositional strategy recommended by de
Roever et al. in [34, §1.6.2]. That is, we show properties of sequential process
automata using the induction principle of Definition 3.1, and then apply generic
proof rules to successively lift such properties over each of the other layers. The
inductive assertion method, as stated by Manna and Pnueli in rule inv-b of [23],
requires a finite set of transition schemas, which, together with the obligation on
initial states yields a set of sufficient verification conditions. We develop this set
in Section 3.1 and use it to derive the main proof rule presented in Section 3.2
together with some examples.
9 Using labels in this way is standard, see, for instance, [23, Chap. 1], or the ‘assertion
networks’ of [34, §2.5.1].
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3.1 Control terms
Given a specification Γ over finitely many process names, we can generate a finite
set of verification conditions because transitions from (’s, ’p, ’l) seqp terms always
yield subterms of terms in Γ . But, rather than simply considering the set of all
subterms, we prefer to define a subset of ‘control terms’ that reduces the number
of verification conditions, avoids tedious duplication in proofs, and corresponds
with the obligations considered in pen-and-paper proofs. The main idea is that
the ⊕ and call operators serve only to combine process terms: they are, in a sense,
executed recursively by seqp-sos (see Section 2.1) to determine the actions that a
term offers to its environment. This is made precise by defining a relation between
sequential process terms.
Definition 3.4 (;Γ ) For a (recursive) specification Γ , let ;Γ be the smallest
relation such that (p ⊕ q) ;Γ p, (p ⊕ q) ;Γ q, and (call(pn)) ;Γ Γ pn.
We write ;Γ ∗ for its reflexive transitive closure. We consider a specification to be
well formed, when the inverse of this relation is well founded:
wellformed Γ = wf {(q, p) | p ;Γ q} .10
Most of our lemmas apply only to well-formed specifications, since otherwise func-
tions over the terms they contain cannot be guaranteed to terminate. Neither of
these two specifications is well formed: Γa(1) = p ⊕ call(1); Γ b(n) = call(n+1).
We will also need a set of ‘start terms’ of a process—the subterms that can act
directly.
Definition 3.5 (sterms) Given a wellformed Γ and a sequential process term p,
sterms Γ p is the set of maximal elements related to p by the reflexive transitive
closure of the ;Γ relation:11
sterms Γ (p ⊕ q) = sterms Γ p ∪ sterms Γ q ,
sterms Γ (call(pn)) = sterms Γ (Γ pn) , and,
sterms Γ p = {p} otherwise.
As an example, consider the sterms of the Γqmsg Qmsg process from Figure 5.
sterms Γqmsg (Γqmsg Qmsg) ={
{Qmsg-:0}receive(λmsg msgs. msgs @ [msg]) . call(Qmsg) ,
{Qmsg-:0}〈λmsgs. if msgs 6= [ ] then {msgs} else ∅〉 ({Qmsg-:1}send(λmsgs. hd msgs) · · · )
}
,
which contains the two subterms from either side of the initial choice: one that
receives and loops, and another that begins by testing the value of msgs. An ex-
ecution of the Γqmsg Qmsg process amounts to an execution of one of these two
terms.
We also define ‘local start terms’ by stermsl (p1 ⊕ p2) = stermsl p1 ∪ stermsl p2
and otherwise stermsl p = {p} to permit the sufficient syntactic condition that a
specification Γ is well formed if call(pn’) /∈ stermsl (Γ pn).
10 A specification is well formed iff it can be converted into one that is weakly guarded in the
sense of [26].
11 This characterization is equivalent to {q | p;Γ ∗ q ∧ (@ q’. q;Γ q’)}. Termination follows
from wellformed Γ , that is, wellformed Γ =⇒ sterms-dom (Γ , p) for all p.
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Since sterms Γqmsg (Γqmsg Qmsg) = stermsl (Γqmsg Qmsg), and Qmsg is the only
process in Γ qmsg, we can conclude that Γ qmsg is well formed,
Similarly to the way that start terms act as direct sources of transitions, we
define ‘derivative terms’ giving possible ‘active’ destinations of transitions.
Definition 3.6 (dterms) Given a wellformed Γ and a sequential process term p,
dterms p is defined by:
dterms Γ (p ⊕ q) = dterms Γ p ∪ dterms Γ q ,
dterms Γ (call(pn)) = dterms Γ (Γ pn) ,
dterms Γ ({l}〈g〉 p) = sterms Γ p ,
dterms Γ ({l}[[u]] p) = sterms Γ p ,
dterms Γ ({l}unicast(sid , smsg ) . p . q) = sterms Γ p ∪ sterms Γ q ,
dterms Γ ({l}broadcast(smsg ) . p) = sterms Γ p ,
dterms Γ ({l}groupcast(sids , smsg ) . p) = sterms Γ p ,
dterms Γ ({l}send(smsg ) . p) = sterms Γ p ,
dterms Γ ({l}deliver(sdata ) . p) = sterms Γ p , and,
dterms Γ ({l}receive(umsg ) . p) = sterms Γ p .
For Γqmsg Qmsg, for example, we calculate dterms Γqmsg (Γqmsg Qmsg) =
{Qmsg-:0}receive(λmsg msgs. msgs @ [msg]) . call(Qmsg) ,
{Qmsg-:0}〈λmsgs. if msgs 6= [ ] then {msgs} else ∅〉 ({Qmsg-:1}send(λmsgs. hd msgs) · · · ) ,
{Qmsg-:1}send(λmsgs. hd msgs) . ({Qmsg-:2}[[λmsgs. tl msgs]] call(Qmsg) ⊕ · · · ) ,
{Qmsg-:1}receive(λmsg msgs. msgs @ [msg]) . call(Qmsg)
.
These derivative terms overapproximate the set of sterms of processes that can be
reached in exactly one transition, since they do not consider the truth of guards
(like msgs 6= [ ]) nor the willingness of communication partners (like receive(...)).
These auxiliary definitions lead to a succinct definition of the set of control
terms of a specification.
Definition 3.7 (cterms) For a specification Γ , cterms is the smallest set where:
p∈ sterms Γ (Γ pn)
p∈ cterms Γ
q∈ cterms Γ p∈ dterms Γ q
p∈ cterms Γ
There are, for example, six control terms in cterms Γqmsg =
{Qmsg-:0}receive(λmsg msgs. msgs @ [msg]) . call(Qmsg) ,
{Qmsg-:0}〈λmsgs. if msgs 6= [ ] then {msgs} else ∅〉 ({Qmsg-:1}send(λmsgs. hd msgs) · · · ) ,
{Qmsg-:1}send(λmsgs. hd msgs) . ({Qmsg-:2}[[λmsgs. tl msgs]] call(Qmsg) ⊕ · · · ) ,
{Qmsg-:2}[[λmsgs. tl msgs]] call(Qmsg) ,
{Qmsg-:2}receive(λmsg msgs. tl msgs @ [msg]) . call(Qmsg) ,
{Qmsg-:1}receive(λmsg msgs. msgs @ [msg]) . call(Qmsg)

.
In terms of the main example, the set cterms ΓToy has fourteen elements; exactly
one for each printed line in Figure 3 or each transition in Figure 4.12
When proving state or transition invariants of the form onl Γ P or onll Γ P, these
are the only control states for which the conditions of Definitions 3.2 and 3.3 need
be checked.
As for sterms, it is useful to define a local version independent of any specification.
12 Of all the control terms, only those beginning with unicast may induce more than one
transition.
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Definition 3.8 (ctermsl) Let ctermsl be the smallest set defined by:
ctermsl (p ⊕ q) = ctermsl p ∪ ctermsl q,
ctermsl (call(pn)) = {call(pn)},
ctermsl ({l}〈g〉 p) = {{l}〈g〉 p} ∪ ctermsl p ,
ctermsl ({l}[[u]] p) = {{l}[[u]] p} ∪ ctermsl p ,
ctermsl ({l}unicast(sid , smsg ) . p . q) = {{l}unicast(sid , smsg ) . p . q}
∪ (ctermsl p ∪ ctermsl q) ,
ctermsl ({l}broadcast(smsg ) . p) = {{l}broadcast(smsg ) . p} ∪ ctermsl p ,
ctermsl ({l}groupcast(sids , smsg ) . p) = {{l}groupcast(sids , smsg ) . p} ∪ ctermsl p ,
ctermsl ({l}send(smsg ) . p) = {{l}send(smsg ) . p} ∪ ctermsl p ,
ctermsl ({l}deliver(sdata ) . p) = {{l}deliver(sdata ) . p} ∪ ctermsl p , and,
ctermsl ({l}receive(umsg ) . p) = {{l}receive(umsg ) . p} ∪ ctermsl p .
For our running example we have ctermsl (Γqmsg Qmsg) = cterms Γqmsg ∪ {call(Qmsg)}.
Including call terms ensures that q∈ stermsl p implies q∈ ctermsl p, which facilitates
proofs. For wellformed Γ, ctermsl allows an alternative definition of cterms,
cterms Γ = {p | ∃ pn. p∈ ctermsl (Γ pn) ∧ not-call p} . (3)
While the original definition is convenient for developing the meta-theory, due to
the accompanying induction principle, this one is more useful for systematically
generating the set of control terms of a specification, and thus, as we will see, sets
of verification conditions. And, for wellformed Γ , we have as a corollary that
cterms Γ = {p | ∃ pn. p∈ subterms (Γ pn) ∧ not-call p ∧ not-choice p} , (4)
where subterms, not-call, and not-choice are defined in the obvious way.
Our example already indicates that cterms over-approximates the set of start
terms of reachable control states. Formally we have the following theorem.
Lemma 3.9 For wellformed Γ and automaton A where control-within Γ (init A) and
trans A = seqp-sos Γ , if (ξ, p)∈ reachable A I and q∈ sterms Γ p then q∈ cterms Γ .
The predicate control-within Γ Z = ∀ (ξ, p)∈Z. ∃ pn. p∈ subterms (Γ pn) serves to state
that the initial control state is within the specification.
3.2 Basic proof rule and invariants
State invariants such as (1) are solved using a procedure whose soundness is jus-
tified as a theorem. The proof exploits (3) and Lemma 3.9.
Theorem 3.10 To prove A ||= (I →) onl Γ P, where wellformed Γ , simple-labels Γ ,
control-within Γ (init A), and trans A = seqp-sos Γ , it suffices
(init) for arbitrary (ξ, p)∈ init A and l∈ labels Γ p, to show P (ξ, l), and,
(trans) for arbitrary p∈ ctermsl (Γ pn), but not-call p, and l∈ labels Γ p, given that
p∈ sterms Γ pp for some (ξ, pp)∈ reachable A I, to assume P (ξ, l), and then
for any a with I a and any (ξ’, q) such that ((ξ, p), a, (ξ’, q))∈ seqp-sos Γ and
l’∈ labels Γ q, to show P (ξ’, l’).
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Here, simple-labels Γ = ∀ pn. ∀ p∈ subterms (Γ pn). ∃! l. labels Γ p = {l}: each subterm
must have exactly one label, that is, ⊕ terms must be labelled consistently. The
specification Γ c Q = {Q-:1}[[f]] call(Q) ⊕ {Q-:2}[[g]] call(Q), for updates f and g, does
not satisfy simple-labels. Overlooking the technicalities, Theorem 3.10 defines the
expected set of verification conditions: we must show that a property P holds of
all initial states and that it is preserved by all transitions from control terms in a
specification Γ .
We incorporate this theorem into a generic tactic that (1) applies it as an in-
troduction rule, (2) replaces p∈ ctermsl (Γ pn) by a disjunction over the values of pn,
(3) applies Definition 3.8 and repeated simplifications of Γ s and eliminations on
disjunctions to generate one subgoal (verification condition) for each control term,
(4) replaces control term derivatives, the subterms in Definition 3.6, by fresh vari-
ables, and, finally, (5) tries to solve each subgoal by simplification. Step 4 replaces
potentially large control terms by their (labelled) heads, which is important for
readability and prover performance. The tactic takes as arguments a list of exist-
ing invariants to include after having applied the introduction rule and a list of
lemmas for trying to solve any subgoals that survive the final simplification. There
are no schematic variables in the subgoals and we benefit greatly from Isabelle’s
parallel_goals tactical [38].
In practice, one states an invariant, applies the tactic, and examines the result-
ing goals. One may need new lemmas for functions over the data state or explicit
proofs for difficult goals. That said, we find that the tactic generally dispatches the
uninteresting goals, and the remaining ones typically correspond with the cases
treated explicitly in the pen-and-paper proofs [5].
Using the generic tactic, the verification of (1) is fully automatic. Isabelle
rapidly dispatches the fourteen cases; one for each element of ctermsl ΓToy.
For transition invariants, we show a counterpart to Theorem 3.10, and declare
it to the tactic described above.
Theorem 3.11 To prove A ||≡ (I →) onll Γ P, where wellformed Γ , simple-labels Γ ,
control-withinΓ (init A), and trans A = seqp-sos Γ, it suffices for arbitrary p∈ ctermsl (Γ pn),
but not-call p, and l∈ labels Γ p, given that p∈ sterms Γ pp for some (ξ, pp)∈ reachable A I,
for any a with I a, and for any (ξ’, q) such that ((ξ, p), a, (ξ’, q))∈ seqp-sos Γ and
l’∈ labels Γ q, to show P ((ξ, l), a, (ξ’, l’)).
Again, stripped of its technicalities, this theorem simply requires checking a
predicate P across all transitions from all control terms in a specification Γ .
Using Theorem 3.11 we can prove that, within our toy-protocol, the value
of no never decreases (Equation (2)). Isabelle dispatches all cases but one, leav-
ing the goal no ξ ≤ no ξ’ to be shown after the update [[λξ. ξ (|nhid := sid ξ|)]] at
line {PToy-:7}. In fact, Isabelle determines that no ξ’ = num ξ, and hence it suffices
to prove no ξ ≤ num ξ before the update. A manual inspection shows that neither
no ξ nor num ξ change after the guard is evaluated and hence that the statement
must be true. However, Isabelle cannot ‘inspect’ the specification and we must
introduce an auxiliary invariant:
ptoy i ||= onl ΓToy (λ(ξ, l). l∈ {PToy-:7..PToy-:8} −→ no ξ ≤ num ξ) .
This state invariant is proven by Isabelle immediately, using our tactic; afterwards
the transition invariant ptoy i ||≡ (λ((ξ, -), -, (ξ’, -)). no ξ ≤ no ξ’) passes without
difficulty.
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4 Open invariance
The analysis of network protocols often requires ‘inter-node’ invariants, like
wf-net-tree Ψ =⇒ closed (pnet (λi. ptoy i 〈〈 qmsg) Ψ) ||=
netglobal (λσ. ∀ i. no (σ i) ≤ no (σ (nhid (σ i)))) , (5)
which states that, for any network topology, specified as a net-tree with disjoint
node addresses (wf-net-tree Ψ), the value of no at a node is never greater than its
value at the ‘next hop’—the address in nhid. This is a property of a global state σ
mapping addresses to corresponding local data states ξ.
We build a global state in two steps. The first step maps a tree of states to a
partial function from addresses to the data states of node processes:
netlift ps (s iR) = [i 7→ fst (ps s)] ,
netlift ps (s q t) = netlift ps s ++ netlift ps t .
The netlift function is parameterized by a ‘process selection’ function ps that is
applied to the state of a node process—that is, a state of the np i of Section 2.4.
In typical applications, such a state is the local parallel composition of a protocol
process and a message queue (see Section 2.2). In such a case, ps selects just the
protocol process, while abstracting from the queue. The first netlift rule associates
the node address i with the process data state. The fst elides the local component
of the process state. The second rule concatenates the partial maps generated for
each branch of the state tree. The assumption of disjoint node addresses is critical
for reasoning about the resulting map.
The idea is to treat all (local) data states ξ as a single global state σ and to
abstract from local details like the process control state and queue. The local details
are important for stating and showing intermediate lemmas, but their inclusion in
global invariants would be an unnecessary complication.
The second step in building the global state is to add default elements df for
undefined addresses i. We first define the auxiliary function
default df f = (λi. case f i of None ⇒ df i | Some s ⇒ s) ,
and then apply it to the result of netlift in the definition of netglobal. For our example
we set
netglobal P = λs. P (default toy-init (netlift fst s)) .
Basically, we associate a state with every node address by setting the state at
non-existent addresses to the initial state (here toy-init). The advantage is that
invariants and associated proofs need not consider the possibility of an undefined
state or, in other words, that σ i could be None. In (5), for example, this convention
avoids three guards on address definedness. One must decide, however, whether
this convention is appropriate for a given property.
While we can readily state inter-node invariants of a complete model, showing
them compositionally is another issue. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 present a way to state
and prove such invariants at the level of sequential processes—in our example that
is, with only ptoy i left of the turnstile. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 present, respectively,
rules for lifting such results to network models and for recovering invariants like (5).
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σ’ i = u (σ i)
((σ, {l}[[u]] p), τ , (σ’, p))∈ oseqp-sos Γ i
σ’ i∈ g (σ i)
((σ, {l}〈g〉 p), τ , (σ’, p))∈ oseqp-sos Γ i
σ’ i = σ i
((σ, {l}unicast(sid , smsg ) . p . q), unicast (sid (σ i)) (smsg (σ i)), (σ’, p))∈ oseqp-sos Γ i
σ’ i = σ i
((σ, {l}unicast(sid , smsg ) . p . q), ¬unicast (sid (σ i)), (σ’, q))∈ oseqp-sos Γ i
σ’ i = σ i
((σ, {l}broadcast(smsg ) . p), broadcast (smsg (σ i)), (σ’, p))∈ oseqp-sos Γ i
σ’ i = σ i
((σ, {l}groupcast(sids , smsg ) . p), groupcast (sids (σ i)) (smsg (σ i)), (σ’, p))∈ oseqp-sos Γ i
σ’ i = σ i
((σ, {l}send(smsg ) . p), send (smsg (σ i)), (σ’, p))∈ oseqp-sos Γ i
σ’ i = umsg msg (σ i)
((σ, {l}receive(umsg ) . p), receive msg, (σ’, p))∈ oseqp-sos Γ i
σ’ i = σ i
((σ, {l}deliver(sdata ) . p), deliver (sdata (σ i)), (σ’, p))∈ oseqp-sos Γ i
((σ, p), a, (σ’, p’))∈ oseqp-sos Γ i
((σ, p ⊕ q), a, (σ’, p’))∈ oseqp-sos Γ i
((σ, q), a, (σ’, q’))∈ oseqp-sos Γ i
((σ, p ⊕ q), a, (σ’, q’))∈ oseqp-sos Γ i
((σ, Γ pn), a, (σ’, p’))∈ oseqp-sos Γ i
((σ, call(pn)), a, (σ’, p’))∈ oseqp-sos Γ i
Fig. 10 Sequential processes: oseqp-sos.
4.1 The open model
In (the standard model of) AWN as presented in Section 2, a network state is a
closed parallel composition of the states of the nodes in the network, arranged in
a tree structure. A state of a node is, in turn, a wrapper around a local parallel
composition of states of sequential processes, each consisting of a local data state ξ
and a control term p. To reason compositionally about the relations between these
local data states, we introduce the open model of AWN. This model collects rele-
vant information from the individual local states ξ into a single global state σ. For
our applications so far, we have not needed to include all local state elements in
this global data state; in fact we need only one local data state per node, namely
the one stemming from the leftmost component of the (non-commutative) local
parallel composition of processes running on that node. The leftmost component
is by convention the main protocol process. This type of global state is not only
sufficient for our purposes, but also easier to manipulate in Isabelle.
Recall that the data type ip contains identifiers for all nodes that could occur
in a network. Since the leftmost parallel process running on a node has a local data
state of type ’k, our global data state is of type ip ⇒ ’k. As described previously,
identifiers that are not in a given network are mapped to default values.
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((σ, s), a, (σ’, s’))∈TA
∧
m. a 6= receive m
((σ, (s, t)), a, (σ’, (s’, t)))∈ oparp-sos i TA TB
(t, a, t’)∈TB
∧
m. a 6= send m σ’ i = σ i
((σ, (s, t)), a, (σ’, (s, t’)))∈ oparp-sos i TA TB
((σ, s), receive m, (σ’, s’))∈TA (t, send m, t’)∈TB
((σ, (s, t)), τ , (σ’, (s’, t’)))∈ oparp-sos i TA TB
Fig. 11 Parallel processes: oparp-sos.
In the open model, a state of a network is described as a pair (σ, s) of such a
global state and a closed parallel composition s of the control states of the nodes
in the network. The control state of a node is a wrapper around a local parallel
composition of states of sequential processes, where we take only the control term p
from the state (ξ, p) of the leftmost parallel process running on the node, and the
entire state from all other components. As a result, a state in the open model
contains exactly the same information as a state in the default model, even if it is
arranged differently.
Figures 10–14 present the SOS rules for the open model. Many of them are
similar to the rules presented in Section 2; for the sake of completeness we list
them nevertheless.
4.1.1 Sequential Processes
The rules for the sequential control terms in the open model, oseqp-sos, are presented
in Figure 10. They are nearly identical to the ones in the original model, but have to
be parameterized by an address i and constrain only that entry of the global state,
either to say how it changes (σ’ i = u (σ i)) or that it does not change (σ’ i = σ i).
These rules do not restrict changes in the data state of any other node j (j 6=i).
In principle, the data states of these nodes can change arbitrarily, so that any
state (σ, p) has infinitely many outgoing transitions. However, the composition
with other nodes, introduced in a higher layer of the process algebra, will limit the
set of outgoing transitions by combining the restrictions imposed by each of the
nodes.
4.1.2 Local parallel composition
The states (σ, s) in an automaton of the open model are of type (ip ⇒ ’k) × ’s with
ip ⇒ ’k the type of global data states and ’s the type of control states. Hence, such
an automaton has type ((ip ⇒ ’k) × ’s, ’a) automaton. The local parallel composition
of the open model pairs an open automaton with a standard one, and thus has type
((ip ⇒ ’k) × ’s, ’a) automaton ⇒ (’t, ’a) automaton ⇒ ((ip ⇒ ’k) × (’s × ’t), ’a) automaton.
The rules for oparp-sos, depicted in Figure 11, only allow the first sub-process
to constrain σ: the global data state that appears in the parallel composition is
simply taken from its first component. This choice precludes comparing the states
of qmsgs (and any other local filters) across a network, but it also simplifies the
mechanics and use of this layer of the framework. Since our mechanization aims at
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((σ, s), unicast dst m, (σ’, s’))∈TA dst∈R
((σ, s iR), {dst}:∗cast(m), (σ’, s’ iR))∈ onode-sos TA
((σ, s), ¬unicast dst, (σ’, s’))∈TA dst /∈ R ∀ j. j 6= i −→ σ’ j = σ j
((σ, s iR), τ , (σ’, s’
i
R))∈ onode-sos TA
((σ, s), broadcast m, (σ’, s’))∈TA
((σ, s iR), R:∗cast(m), (σ’, s’ iR))∈ onode-sos TA
((σ, s), groupcast D m, (σ’, s’))∈TA
((σ, s iR), (R ∩ D):∗cast(m), (σ’, s’ iR))∈ onode-sos TA
((σ, s), receive m, (σ’, s’))∈TA
((σ, s iR), {i}¬∅:arrive(m), (σ’, s’ iR))∈ onode-sos TA
((σ, s), deliver d, (σ’, s’))∈TA ∀ j. j 6= i −→ σ’ j = σ j
((σ, s iR), i:deliver(d), (σ’, s’
i
R))∈ onode-sos TA
((σ, s), τ , (σ’, s’))∈TA ∀ j 6= i. σ’ j = σ j
((σ, s iR), τ , (σ’, s’
i
R))∈ onode-sos TA
σ’ i = σ i
((σ, s iR), ∅¬{i}:arrive(m), (σ’, s iR))∈ onode-sos TA
σ’ i = σ i
((σ, s iR), connect(i, i’), (σ’, s
i
R ∪ {i’}))∈ onode-sos TA
σ’ i = σ i
((σ, s iR), connect(i’, i), (σ’, s
i
R ∪ {i’}))∈ onode-sos TA
σ’ i = σ i
((σ, s iR), disconnect(i, i’), (σ’, s
i
R - {i’}))∈ onode-sos TA
σ’ i = σ i
((σ, s iR), disconnect(i’, i), (σ’, s
i
R - {i’}))∈ onode-sos TA
i 6= i’ i 6= i’’ σ’ i = σ i
((σ, s iR), connect(i’, i’’), (σ’, s
i
R))∈ onode-sos TA
i 6= i’ i 6= i’’ σ’ i = σ i
((σ, s iR), disconnect(i’, i’’), (σ’, s
i
R))∈ onode-sos TA
Fig. 12 Nodes: onode-sos.
the verification of (routing) protocols [5], which nearly always implement a queue,
simplifying the mechanization in this way seems reasonable. The treatment of the
other layers is independent of this choice. So, if our work were to be applied in
another setting where queues are not used, or where data states of more than one
parallel control term need to be lifted to a control state, only this layer need be
adapted.
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((σ, s), R:∗cast(m), (σ’, s’))∈TA
((σ, t), H¬K:arrive(m), (σ’, t’))∈TB H ⊆ R K ∩ R = ∅
((σ, s q t), R:∗cast(m), (σ’, s’ q t’))∈ opnet-sos TA TB
((σ, s), H¬K:arrive(m), (σ’, s’))∈TA
((σ, t), R:∗cast(m), (σ’, t’))∈TB H ⊆ R K ∩ R = ∅
((σ, s q t), R:∗cast(m), (σ’, s’ q t’))∈ opnet-sos TA TB
((σ, s), H¬K:arrive(m), (σ’, s’))∈TA ((σ, t), H’¬K’:arrive(m), (σ’, t’))∈TB
((σ, s q t), (H ∪ H’)¬(K ∪ K’):arrive(m), (σ’, s’ q t’))∈ opnet-sos TA TB
((σ, s), i:deliver(d), (σ’, s’))∈TA
((σ, s q t), i:deliver(d), (σ’, s’ q t))∈ opnet-sos TA TB
((σ, t), i:deliver(d), (σ’, t’))∈TB
((σ, s q t), i:deliver(d), (σ’, s q t’))∈ opnet-sos TA TB
((σ, s), τ , (σ’, s’))∈TA
((σ, s q t), τ , (σ’, s’ q t))∈ opnet-sos TA TB
((σ, t), τ , (σ’, t’))∈TB
((σ, s q t), τ , (σ’, s q t’))∈ opnet-sos TA TB
((σ, s), connect(i, i’), (σ’, s’))∈TA ((σ, t), connect(i, i’), (σ’, t’))∈TB
((σ, s q t), connect(i, i’), (σ’, s’ q t’))∈ opnet-sos TA TB
((σ, s), disconnect(i, i’), (σ’, s’))∈TA ((σ, t), disconnect(i, i’), (σ’, t’))∈TB
((σ, s q t), disconnect(i, i’), (σ’, s’ q t’))∈ opnet-sos TA TB
Fig. 13 Partial networks: opnet-sos.
4.1.3 Nodes and partial networks
The sets onode-sos (Figure 12) and opnet-sos (Figure 13) need not be parameterized
by an address since they are generated inductively from lower layers. Together they
constrain parts of σ. This occurs naturally for rules like those for arrive and ∗cast,
where the synchronous communication serves as a conjunction of constraints on
different parts of σ. But for others that normally only constrain a single element,
like those for τ , assumptions (∀ j 6= i. σ’ j = σ j) are introduced here and dispatched
later (Section 4.4). Such assumptions aid later proofs, but they must be justified
when transferring results to closed systems.
4.1.4 Complete networks
The rules for ocnet-sos are shown in Figure 14. Each rule includes a precondition
that ensures that elements not addressed within a model do not change: net-ips
gives the set of node addresses in a state of a partial network.
4.1.5 Application
We now show how to construct an open model. For the running example, a se-
quential instance of the toy protocol is defined as
optoy i = (|init = {(toy-init, ΓToy PToy)}, trans = oseqp-sos ΓToy i|) ,
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((σ, s), connect(i, i’), (σ’, s’))∈TA ∀ j. j /∈ net-ips s −→ σ’ j = σ j
((σ, s), connect(i, i’), (σ’, s’))∈ ocnet-sos TA
((σ, s), disconnect(i, i’), (σ’, s’))∈TA ∀ j. j /∈ net-ips s −→ σ’ j = σ j
((σ, s), disconnect(i, i’), (σ’, s’))∈ ocnet-sos TA
((σ, s), R:∗cast(m), (σ’, s’))∈TA ∀ j. j /∈ net-ips s −→ σ’ j = σ j
((σ, s), τ , (σ’, s’))∈ ocnet-sos TA
((σ, s), τ , (σ’, s’))∈TA ∀ j. j /∈ net-ips s −→ σ’ j = σ j
((σ, s), τ , (σ’, s’))∈ ocnet-sos TA
((σ, s), i:deliver(d), (σ’, s’))∈TA ∀ j. j /∈ net-ips s −→ σ’ j = σ j
((σ, s), i:deliver(d), (σ’, s’))∈ ocnet-sos TA
((σ, s), {i}¬K:arrive(Newpkt d dst), (σ’, s’))∈TA ∀ j. j /∈ net-ips s −→ σ’ j = σ j
((σ, s), i:newpkt(d, dst), (σ’, s’))∈ ocnet-sos TA
Fig. 14 Complete networks: ocnet-sos.
combined with the standard qmsg process into
onp i = optoy i 〈〈i qmsg ,
using the operator
A 〈〈i B = (|init = {(σ, (s, t)) | (σ, s)∈ init A ∧ t∈ init B},
trans = oparp-sos i (trans A) (trans B)|) ,
and lifted to the node level via the open node constructor
〈i : onp : R0〉o = (|init = {(σ, s iR0 ) | (σ, s)∈ init onp}, trans = onode-sos (trans onp)|) .
Similarly, to map a net-tree term to an open model we define:
opnet onp 〈i; R0〉 = 〈i : onp i : R0〉o
opnet onp (Ψ1‖Ψ2) = (|init = {(σ, s1q s2) | (σ, s1)∈ init (opnet onp Ψ1)
∧ (σ, s2)∈ init (opnet onp Ψ2)
∧ net-ips s1 ∩ net-ips s2 = ∅},
trans = opnet-sos (trans (opnet onp Ψ1)) (trans (opnet onp Ψ2))|) .
The third requirement on initial states makes the open model non-empty only for
net-trees with disjoint node addresses. Including such a constraint within the open
model, rather than as a separate assumption like the wf-net-tree n in (5), eliminates
an annoying technicality from the inductions described in Section 4.3. As with
the extra premises in the open SOS rules, we can freely adjust the open model to
facilitate proofs, but each ‘encoded assumption’ becomes an obligation that must
be discharged in the transfer lemma of Section 4.4.
Of course, the above constructs apply to any function onp from addresses to
automata in the open model, that is, any onp of type ip⇒ ((ip⇒ ’k) × ’s, ’a) automaton.
An operator for adding the last layer is also readily defined by
oclosed A = A(|trans := ocnet-sos (trans A)|) ,
giving all the definitions necessary to turn a standard model into an open one.
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4.2 Open invariants
The basic definitions of reachability, invariance, and transition invariance, Defi-
nitions 3.1–3.3, apply to open models since they are given for generic automata,
but constructing a compositional proof requires considering the effects of both
synchronized and interleaved actions of possible environments. Our automaton A
could, for instance, be a partial network, consisting of several nodes, and the envi-
ronment could be another partial network running in parallel. An action performed
by the environment and the automaton together, or indeed, since the distinction is
unimportant here, by the automaton alone, is termed synchronized and an action
made by the environment without the participation of the automaton is termed
interleaved. We identify the nature of a synchronized action by the environment
through the action of A that synchronizes with it. We focus first of all on the case
where A is a single node i.
The proper analysis of properties of A, such as (5), often requires assumptions
on the behaviour of the environment. We consider assumptions on both synchro-
nized and interleaved actions.
A typical example for an assumption on synchronized actions is
(∀ j. j 6= i −→ no (σ j) ≤ no (σ’ j)) ∧ orecvmsg msg-ok σ a , (6)
where orecvmsg applies a predicate (here msg-ok) to receive actions and is otherwise
true: msg-ok σ (Pkt data src) = (data ≤ no (σ src)) and msg-ok σ (Newpkt d dst) = True. So,
the assumption manifests two properties of the environment (nodes that are not
equal to i) (1) it guarantees that all nodes different from i preserve the property
that the value of no cannot be decreased by the protocol; (2) whenever a Pkt
message is sent, the value d stored in the message is smaller than or equal to the
current value of no, stored at the sender of the message src. The synchronization
occurs via the exchange of messages.
A typical example for an interleaved (un-synchronized) action from the envi-
ronment is
(∀ j. j 6= i −→ no (σ j) ≤ no (σ’ j)) ∧ σ’ i = σ i , (7)
This assumption states that (1) nodes that are not equal to i do not decrease the
value of no—as before—and (2) that the data state at node i does not change. So
transitions of the environment may interleave with actions performed by node i,
as long as they are ‘well-behaved’ and do not interfere with the state of i.
Definition 4.1 (open reachability) Given an automaton A and assumptions S
and U over, respectively, synchronized and interleaved actions of the environment,
oreachable A S U is the smallest set defined by the rules:
(σ, s)∈ init A
(σ, s)∈ oreachable A S U
(σ, s)∈ oreachable A S U U σ σ’
(σ’, s)∈ oreachable A S U
(σ, s)∈ oreachable A S U ((σ, s), a, (σ’, s’))∈ trans A S σ σ’ a
(σ’, s’)∈ oreachable A S U .
The first rule declares all initial states reachable. The second declares as reach-
able all states that result from an interleaving transition of the environment that
satisfies U and where the process s does not perform any action. In the third
rule process s performs an action that yields a reachable state if s in combination
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σ, s σ’, s’ σ’’, s’
a
S σ σ’ a U σ’ σ”
Fig. 15 Open reachability with assumptions on synchronized and interleaved actions.
with the global data state was reachable and if the assumption S is respected by
the action and the environment. Figure 15 illustrates the main idea of synchro-
nized and interleaved actions—the solid arrow represents an action a performed
by state (σ, s), the dashed arrows indicate transitions taken by other nodes (on
the left in synchrony with action a).
In practice, we use restricted forms otherwith E N I and other E N of the assump-
tions S and U, respectively:
otherwith E N I σ σ’ a = (∀ i. i /∈ N −→ E (σ i) (σ’ i)) ∧ I σ a , and (8)
other E N σ σ’ = ∀ i. if i∈N then σ’ i = σ i else E (σ i) (σ’ i) . (9)
The requirements (6) and (7), presented above, have exactly these forms.
The assumptions otherwith and other are parameterized with a set N of type ip
set of scoped nodes—those that occur in the control states of the automaton. They
both restrict the environments under consideration by applying a predicate E of
type ’s ⇒ ’s ⇒ bool to possible changes of (local) data states of nodes i of the
environment. In addition, otherwith permits constraints on the information I from
shared actions, like broadcast or receive. These constraints refer to the action a and
the global data state σ.
In contrast to (8), Equation (9) excludes changes in scoped nodes (σ’ i = σ i).
Definition 4.2 (open invariance) Given an automaton A and assumptions S
and U over synchronized and interleaved actions, respectively, a predicate P is an
open invariant, denoted A |= (S, U →) P, iff ∀ s∈ oreachable A S U. P s.
It follows easily that existing invariants can be made open. In practice, this means
that most invariants can be shown in the basic context but still exploited in the
more complicated one.
Lemma 4.3 Given an invariant A ||= (I →) P where trans A = seqp-sos Γ , and any
predicate F, there is an open invariant A’ |= (λ- -. I, other F {i} →) (λ(σ, p). P (σ i, p))
where trans A’ = oseqp-sos Γ i, provided that init A = {(σ i, p) | (σ, p)∈ init A’}.
Open transition invariance and a similar transfer lemma are defined similarly. The
meta theory for basic invariants is also readily adapted, in particular,
Theorem 4.4 To show A |= (S, U→) onl Γ P, in addition to the conditions and the
obligations (init) and (trans) of Theorem 3.10, suitably adjusted, it suffices,
(env) for arbitrary (σ, p)∈ oreachable A S U and l∈ labels Γ p ,
to assume both P (σ, l) and U σ σ’, and then to show P (σ’, l) .
This theorem (together the counterpart of Theorem 3.11 for open transition in-
variance) is declared to the tactic described in Section 3.2 and proofs proceed as
before, but with the new obligation to show invariance over interleaved transitions.
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cnet-sos ocnet-sos
pnet-sos opnet-sos
node-sos onode-sos
parp-sos oparp-sos
seqp-sos oseqp-sos
closed (pnet (λi. ptoy i 〈〈 qmsg) Ψ) ||= P
ptoy i ||= P1 optoy i |= P ′1
optoy i 〈〈 qmsg |= P ′2
〈i : optoy i 〈〈 qmsg : R0〉o |= P ′3
opnet (λi. optoy i 〈〈 qmsg) Ψ |= P ′4
oclosed (opnet (λi. optoy i 〈〈 qmsg) Ψ) |= P ′5
Corollary 4.8
(qmsg lifting)
Corollary 4.10
(onode lifting)
Corollary 4.12
(opnet lifting)
Corollary 4.14
(ocnet lifting)
Corollary 4.16 (transfer)
Lemma 4.3 (‘open’ invariant)
Theorem 3.10
invariance proof
Theorem 4.4
open invariance proof
Fig. 16 Schema of the overall proof structure.
We finally have sufficient machinery to state and prove Invariant (5) at the
level of a sequential process:
optoy i |= (otherwith nos-inc {i} (orecvmsg msg-ok), other nos-inc {i} →)
(λ(σ, -). no (σ i) ≤ no (σ (nhid (σ i)))) , (10)
where nos-inc ξ ξ’ = no ξ ≤ no ξ’, So, given that the variables no in the environment
never decrease and that incoming Pkts reflect the state of the sender, there is a
relation between the local node and the next hop. Similar invariants occur in proofs
of realistic protocols [5].
4.3 Lifting open invariants
The preceding two sections provide enough machinery to state and show global
invariants at the level of sequential processes, that is, over automata like optoy i in
Invariant (10). It still remains to extend such results to models of entire networks,
and ultimately to re-establish them in the original model of Section 2.
Our approach is sketched in Figure 16. We prove as many invariants as possible
in the closed sequential model (seqp-sos) as described in Section 3.2. These invari-
ants are extended to the open sequential model (oseqp-sos) using Lemma 4.3, where
they support proofs of the forms of global invariants described in Section 4.2. In-
variants that cannot be stated in seqp-sos, because they interrelate the states of
multiple nodes, are proved directly in oseqp-sos using Theorem 4.4 and its counter
part for open transition invariance. Once established in oseqp-sos, global invari-
ants can be lifted successively over the composition operators of the open model
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(oparp-sos, onode-sos, opnet-sos, ocnet-sos), using the lemmas described in this section,
and then transferred into the closed complete model (cnet-sos), using the lemma
described in the next section. Figure 16 shows, in grey, examples of the forms of
invariants at each stage. The goal is to show a property P over an entire arbitrary
network in the closed model (at top-left). The property P is proven via a succes-
sion of intermediate invariants, starting with P1, which is expressed relative to a
single node, possibly in relation to the rest of the network (P ′1). At each step its
form changes slightly (P ′2, P ′3, P ′4, and P ′5) to hide technical details introduced at
each layer and as its range extends to multiple nodes.
The first lifting rule (Corollary 4.8) treats composition with the qmsg process.
It mixes oreachable and reachable predicates: the former for the automaton being
lifted, the latter for properties of qmsg. Two main properties of qmsg are required:
only received messages are added to the queue and sent messages come from the
queue. They are shown using the techniques of Section 3.
Lemma 4.5 qmsg ||≡ (λ((msgs, q), a, (msgs’, q’)).
case a of receive m ⇒ set msgs’ ⊆ set (msgs @ [m])
| - ⇒ set msgs’ ⊆ set msgs) .
Lemma 4.6 qmsg ||≡ (λ((msgs, q), a, -). sendmsg (λm. m∈ set msgs) a) .
These two properties of qmsg are used to prove a lemma that decomposes open
reachability of A 〈〈i qmsg into open reachability of A and reachability of qmsg.
Lemma 4.7 (qmsg reachability)
Given (σ, (s, (msgs, q)))∈ oreachable (A 〈〈i qmsg) S U, with assumptions on synchronizing
and interleaved transitions S = otherwith E {i} (orecvmsg M) and U = other F {i}, and
provided
1. F is reflexive,
2. for all ξ, ξ’, E ξ ξ’ implies F ξ ξ’,
3. A |≡ (S, U →) (λ((σ, -), -, (σ’, -)). F (σ i) (σ’ i)), and,
4. for all σ, σ’, m, ∀ j. F (σ j) (σ’ j) and M σ m imply M σ’ m,
then (σ, s)∈ oreachable A S U and (msgs, q)∈ reachable qmsg (recvmsg (M σ)), and further-
more ∀m∈ set msgs. M σ m.
In the qmsg part of the local state (msgs, q), msgs is a list of messages and q is the
control state of the queue. We write set msgs to generate a set of messages from the
list of messages. The key intuition behind the four clauses is that every message m
received, queued, and sent by qmsg must satisfy M σ m. That is, the properties
of messages received into the queue continue to hold—even as the environment
and thus the original senders act—until those messages are transmitted from the
queue to the automaton A. The proof is by induction over oreachable. The M’s are
preserved when the external environment acts independently (1, 4), when it acts
synchronously (2, 4), and when the local process acts (3, 4).
The preceding lemma allows open reachability of the parallel composition to
be decomposed into (open) reachability of its components. It follows easily that an
invariant of the principle component (A) is also an invariant of the composition.
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Corollary 4.8 (qmsg lifting) Given A |= (S, U→) (λ(σ, -). P σ), with the predicates
S = otherwith E {i} (orecvmsg M) and U = other F {i}, and provided
1. F is reflexive,
2. for all ξ, ξ’, E ξ ξ’ implies F ξ ξ’,
3. A |≡ (S, U →) (λ((σ, -), -, (σ’, -)). F (σ i) (σ’ i)) , and,
4. for all σ, σ’, m, ∀ j. F (σ j) (σ’ j) and M σ m imply M σ’ m,
then A 〈〈i qmsg |= (S, U →) (λ(σ, -). P σ).
This lifting rule is specific to the queue model presented in Figure 5. Changes to
the model may necessitate changes to the rule or its proof, or indeed, a different
parallel composition would require a new rule and proof. No assumptions are made,
however, on the structure of A, the automaton being lifted.
The rule for lifting to the node level is straightforward since a node simply
encapsulates the state of the underlying model. It is necessary, though, to adapt
assumptions on receive actions (orecvmsg) to arrive actions (oarrivemsg), but this is
essentially a minor technicality.
Lemma 4.9 (onode reachability) If, for all ξ and ξ’, E ξ ξ’ implies F ξ ξ’, then
given (σ, s iR)∈ oreachable (〈i : A : R0〉o) (otherwith E {i} (oarrivemsg M)) (other F {i}) it
follows that (σ, s)∈ oreachable A (otherwith E {i} (orecvmsg M)) (other F {i}).
The sole condition E ξ ξ’ ⇒ F ξ ξ’ is needed because certain node-level actions—
namely connect, disconnect, and ∅¬{i}:arrive(m)—synchronize with the environment
(giving E ξ ξ’) but appear to ‘stutter’ (requiring F ξ ξ’) relative to the underly-
ing process. That is, showing oreachable by induction involves the three cases in
Definition 4.1. The first two, initial states and interleaved actions, follow directly
from the induction hypothesis at the node level. For the third, synchronized ac-
tions where A participates also follow directly, but when the node layer acts alone
we only know that the state component of A is unchanged (σ’ i = σ i) and that
changes in the environment components (σ’ j for all j 6=i) satisfy the synchronizing
assumption (E). The implication between E and F gives other F {i} and thus open
reachability in A is preserved by applying the rule for an interleaved transition.
Corollary 4.10 (onode lifting) If, for all ξ and ξ’, E ξ ξ’ implies F ξ ξ’, then
given A |= (otherwith E {i} (orecvmsg M), other F {i} →) (λ(σ, -). P σ) it follows that
〈i : A : R0〉o |= (otherwith E {i} (oarrivemsg M), other F {i} →) (λ(σ, -). P σ).
The lifting rule for partial networks is the most demanding to state and prove.
We require the function net-tree-ips, which gives the set of addresses in a net-tree. It
is defined in the obvious way:
net-tree-ips 〈i; R0〉 = {i} , and
net-tree-ips (Ψ1‖Ψ2) = net-tree-ips Ψ1 ∪ net-tree-ips Ψ2 .
This function is important for bookkeeping in inductions over net-trees since it
allows the identification of the nodes on either side of a partial network composi-
tion.13 In turn, this identification determines which nodes are scoped to each side
of the composition, and whose properties are assured by the induction hypothesis,
13 Recall that the wf-net-tree condition on the disjointness of such sets is encoded in opnet.
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and which are in the environment, and whose properties are thus assumed by the
induction hypothesis.
Similarly to the treatment of parallel composition with qmsg, it is necessary to
break the open reachability of a composition of partial networks into open reacha-
bility of both components. For this, we require transition invariants guaranteeing
that the messages sent by nodes in one partial network satisfy the assumptions
made by nodes in the other partial network on messages arriving from their en-
vironment. We therefore introduce the castmsg predicate: castmsg M σ (R:∗cast(m))
iff M σ m, while castmsg M σ a is true for all other a.
Lemma 4.11 (opnet reachability) If (σ, s qt)∈ oreachable (opnet onp (Ψ1‖Ψ2)) S U,
with S = otherwith E (net-tree-ips (Ψ1‖Ψ2)) (oarrivemsg M), U = other F (net-tree-ips (Ψ1‖Ψ2)),
and E and F reflexive, and given
1. 〈i : onp i : R0〉o |≡ (λσ -. oarrivemsg M σ, other F {i} →)
(λ((σ, -), a, (σ’, -)). castmsg M σ a) ,
2. 〈i : onp i : R0〉o |≡ (λσ -. oarrivemsg M σ, other F {i} →)
(λ((σ, -), a, (σ’, -)). a 6= τ ∧ (∀ d. a 6= i:deliver(d)) −→ E (σ i) (σ’ i)) , and
3. 〈i : onp i : R0〉o |≡ (λσ -. oarrivemsg M σ, other F {i} →)
(λ((σ, -), a, (σ’, -)). a = τ ∨ (∃ d. a = i:deliver(d)) −→ F (σ i) (σ’ i)) ,
then it follows that both
1. (σ, s)∈ oreachable (opnet onp Ψ1) S1 U1 and
2. (σ, t)∈ oreachable (opnet onp Ψ2) S2 U2 ,
where S1 = otherwith E (net-tree-ips Ψ1) (oarrivemsg M) , U1 = other F (net-tree-ips Ψ1) ,
S2 = otherwith E (net-tree-ips Ψ2) (oarrivemsg M) , and U2 = other F (net-tree-ips Ψ2) .
The proof is by induction over oreachable. The initial and interleaved cases are triv-
ial. For the local case, given open reachability of (σ, s) and (σ, t) for Ψ1 and Ψ2,
respectively, and ((σ, s q t), a, (σ’, s’q t’))∈ trans (opnet onp (Ψ1 ‖Ψ2)), we must show
open reachability of (σ’, s’) and (σ’, t’). The proof proceeds by a case distinction on
actions a. The key step is to have stated the lemma without introducing cyclic de-
pendencies between (synchronizing) assumptions and (transition-invariant) guar-
antees: that is, each partial network Ψ i assumes that the other partial network Ψj
satisfies Sj and Uj , while itself guaranteeing Si and Ui thanks to the lifting of Con-
ditions (2) and (3). For a synchronizing action like arrive, Definition 4.1 requires
satisfaction of S1 in order to advance in Ψ1 and of S2 to advance in Ψ2, but the
assumption S only guarantees that E holds for addresses j /∈ net-tree-ips (Ψ1‖Ψ2)—
the gap is filled by Assumption (2). This is why the transition invariants required
of nodes (Conditions (1–3)) may not assume otherwith E {i}. This is not unduly
restrictive, since the transition invariants provide guarantees for individual local
state elements and not between network nodes. The assumption oarrivemsg M σ is
never cyclic: it is either assumed of the environment for paired arrives, or trivially
satisfied for the side that ∗casts.
The transition invariants are lifted from nodes to networks by induction over
net-trees, using the above decomposition of open reachability. For non-synchronizing
actions, we exploit the extra guarantees built into the open SOS rules.
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Corollary 4.12 (opnet lifting) Given
〈i : onp i : R0〉o |= (otherwith E {i} (oarrivemsg M), other F {i} →) (λ(σ, -). P i σ)
and provided that,
1. 〈i : onp i : R0〉o |≡ (λ(σ, -) . oarrivemsg M σ, other F {i} →)
(λ((σ, -), a, (σ’, -)). castmsg M σ a) ,
2. 〈i : onp i : R0〉o |≡ (λ(σ, -) . oarrivemsg M σ, other F {i} →)
(λ((σ, -), a, (σ’, -)). a 6= τ ∧ (∀ d. a 6= i:deliver(d)) −→ E (σ i) (σ’ i)) , and
3. 〈i : onp i : R0〉o |≡ (λ(σ, -) . oarrivemsg M σ, other F {i} →)
(λ((σ, -), a, (σ’, -)). a = τ ∨ (∃ d. a = i:deliver(d)) −→ F (σ i) (σ’ i)) ,
for all i and R0, with E and F reflexive, then
opnet onp Ψ |= (otherwith E (net-tree-ips Ψ) (oarrivemsg M), other F (net-tree-ips Ψ) →)
(λ(σ, -). ∀ i∈ net-tree-ips Ψ . P i σ) .
For transition invariants, we obtain results similar to Corollaries 4.8, 4.10,
and 4.12. They are essential for discharging the three conditions of Corollary 4.12.
The rule for closed networks is similar to the others. Its important function is
to eliminate the synchronizing assumption (S in the lemmas above), since messages
no longer arrive from the environment. The conclusion of this rule has the form
required by the transfer lemma of the next section.
Lemma 4.13 (ocnet reachability)
From (σ, s)∈ oreachable (oclosed (opnet onp Ψ)) (λ- - -. True) U, it follows that
(σ, s)∈ oreachable (opnet onp Ψ) (otherwith (op =) (net-tree-ips Ψ) inoclosed) U ,14 where
inoclosed σ (H¬K:arrive(Newpkt d dst)), but ¬ inoclosed σ (H¬K:arrive(m)), for all other m,
¬ inoclosed σ (i:newpkt(d, dst)), and otherwise, for all other a, inoclosed σ a.
That is, reachability in opnet onp p prior to closing need not consider transitions with
the action arrive for any message other than a Newpkt, nor with the action newpkt.
Corollary 4.14 (ocnet lifting)
From opnet np Ψ |= (otherwith (op =) (net-tree-ips Ψ) inoclosed, U →) P, it follows that
oclosed (opnet np Ψ) |= (λ- - -. True, U →) P.
4.4 Transferring open invariants
The rules in the last section extend invariants over sequential processes, like (10),
for example, to arbitrary, open network models. All that remains is to transfer the
extended invariants to the standard model. Our approach is to define a relation
between a standard automaton and an open automaton, for instance at the level
of local parallel processes, and then to show that this relation implies the desired
transfer property between the respective network models at the closed level.
We construct our proofs using Isabelle’s locale feature [20], which allows one
to fix a set of constants and their properties, and then to derive lemmas about
them. The constants can later be instantiated with any terms that satisfy the as-
sumed properties and the system automatically specializes the associated lemmas.
Specifically, we define the locale openproc np onp sr, which relates the three constants
14 The predicate (op =) simply compares its two arguments for equality.
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σ i = fst (sr s)
∧
s (σ, snd(sr s))
=⇒
s’ (σ’, snd(sr s’))
∧
σ’ i = fst (sr s’)
a ∈ trans (np i) a ∈ trans (onp i)
Fig. 17 Schema of the openproc np onp sr relation.
1. np of type ip ⇒ (’s, proc-action) automaton ,
2. onp of type ip ⇒ ((ip ⇒ ’k) × ’t, proc-action) automaton , and
3. sr of type ’s ⇒ ’k × ’t ,
where proc-action stands for the actions on transitions in Figures 2 and 6, and
where sr is a simulation relation that effectively divides the states of np i into
data and control states. Unlike for the process selection function ps described in
Section 4, we cannot simply discard control state elements because they are critical
to formalizing and reasoning about the relationship between the two automata.
The three constants must satisfy two technical conditions that guarantee that the
initial states of np i are correctly ‘embedded’ into the (global) initial states of onp i,
which we do not detail here, and a condition relating transitions across the two
models. The condition on transitions is illustrated in Figure 17: for every transition
(s, a, s’)∈ trans (np i), and given σ i = fst (sr s) and σ’ i = fst (sr s’), it must be the case
that ((σ, snd (sr s)), a, (σ’, snd (sr s’)))∈ trans (onp i). In other words, openproc np onp sr
holds if onp simulates np for each component i of σ.
The simulation requirement ensures that any step of the standard model is
taken into account by the corresponding open model. Indeed, for any state reach-
able in the standard model, a corresponding state is reachable in the open model.
Lemma 4.15 (transfer reachability) Given np, onp, and sr such that openproc
np onp sr, then for any wf-net-tree Ψ and s∈ reachable (closed (pnet np Ψ)) (λ-. True), it
follows that
(default (someinit np sr) (netlift sr s), netliftc sr s)
∈ oreachable (oclosed (opnet onp Ψ)) (λ- - -. True) U.
This lemma uses two openproc constants: someinit np sr i chooses an arbitrary initial
data state from np i,15 with which default completes missing state elements, and
netliftc lifts the control part of a process state to nodes and partial networks:
netliftc sr (s iR) = (snd (sr s))
i
R
netliftc sr (s q t) = (netliftc sr s) q (netliftc sr t) .
Lemma 4.15 is shown by lifting the simulation relation to nodes and partial net-
works by an induction on Ψ . A separate subproof is required for each type of
action and the assumptions incorporated into the corresponding open SOS rules
(see Sections 4.1.3 and 4.1.4) are ‘discharged’ using contextual information from
15 SOME x. x∈ (fst ◦ sr) ‘ init (np i), where the ‘‘’ is the image operator.
Mechanizing a Process Algebra for Network Protocols 33
the transition in the standard model. The result is that every transition in the
standard model (closed (pnet np Ψ)) is simulated by a transition in the open model
(oclosed (opnet onp Ψ)). An implication from an open invariant on an open model to
an invariant on the corresponding standard model follows directly.
Corollary 4.16 (transfer) Given np, onp, and sr such that openproc np onp sr, and
provided wf-net-tree Ψ , then from oclosed (opnet onp Ψ) |= (λ- - -. True, U →) (λ(σ,-). P σ),
it follows that closed (pnet np Ψ) ||= netglobal np sr P.
In terms of our running example, we first show openproc ptoy optoy id. We then
apply a generic sublocale relation for parallel composition with qmsg to obtain
openproc (λi. ptoy i 〈〈 qmsg) (λi. optoy i 〈〈i qmsg) (λ((ξ, p), q). (ξ, (p, q))), to which we can
apply Corollary 4.16 to obtain an appropriate transfer lemma. Compared to the
netglobal constant in Invariant (5), the one in Corollary 4.16 is defined generically
within the openproc locale and is therefore parameterized by np and sr. The former
is obtained from the latter by a simple instantiation.
Summary. The technicalities of the lemmas in this and the preceding section are
essential for the underlying proofs to succeed. The key idea is that through an open
version of AWN where automaton states are segregated into data and control
components, one can reason locally about global properties, but still, using the
transfer and lifting results, obtain a result over the original model (c.f. Figure 16).
5 Concluding remarks
We present a mechanization of AWN, a modelling language for MANET andWMN
protocols, including a streamlined adaptation of standard theory for showing in-
variants of individual reactive processes, and a novel and compositional framework
for lifting such results to network models. The framework allows the statement and
proof of inter-node properties. We think that many elements of our approach would
apply to similarly structured models in other formalisms.
It is reasonable to ask whether the basic model presented in Section 2 could not
simply be abandoned in favour of the open model of Section 4.1. We believe, how-
ever, that the basic model is the most natural way of describing what AWN means,
proving semantic properties of the language, showing ‘node-only’ invariants, and,
potentially, for showing refinement relations. Having such a reference model allows
us to freely incorporate assumptions into the open SOS rules, knowing that their
soundness will later be justified.
The AODV case study. The framework we present in this paper was successfully
applied in the mechanization of a proof of loop freedom [11, §7] of the AODV
protocol [31], a widely-used routing protocol designed for MANETs, and one of
the four protocols currently standardized by the IETF MANET working group.
The model has about 100 control locations across 6 different processes, and uses
about 40 functions to manipulate the data state. The main property (loop freedom)
roughly states that ‘a data packet is never sent round in circles without being
delivered’. To establish this property, we proved around 400 lemmas. Due to the
complexity of the protocol logic and the length of the proof, we present the details
elsewhere [5]. The case study shows that the presented framework can be applied
to verification tasks of industrial relevance.
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Verifying implementations.We argue in the introduction that AWN is well-adapted
for modelling MANET and WMN protocols due to its support for their data struc-
tures and specialized communication primitives, and also because of its operational
style. In the rest of the paper, we present techniques for the machine-assisted and
compositional verification of safety properties of networks of cooperating nodes;
and we claim that the AODV case study is testament to the effectiveness of this
approach. An important question remains: are AWN models suitable specifications
for protocol implementations? For instance, is it feasible to prove that a program
written in C or a similar programming language correctly implements a sequential
AWN process? Would it be better to try to refine or transform an AWN process
into an executable form? Or simply to analyse network traces against an instan-
tiation of the model [2]? In any case, all of these challenges require precise, and
ideally mechanized, protocol models, and proofs that they satisfy given properties.
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